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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Katherine Dunbar Landess, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000645 

Appellate Case No. 2015-000646 

ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel petitions the Court to transfer respondent to 
incapacity inactive status pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver, Peyre T. 
Lumpkin, pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE.   
IT IS ORDERED that respondent is transferred to incapacity inactive status until
further order of this Court. 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution, including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Lumpkin is hereby appointed to assume
responsibility for respondent's client files, trust account(s), escrow account(s), 
operating account(s), and any other law office account(s) respondent may 
maintain. Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, 
SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  Mr. Lumpkin may make 
disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating 
account(s), and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain that are 
necessary to effectuate this appointment.  Respondent shall promptly respond to 
Mr. Lumpkin's requests for information and/or documentation and shall fully 
cooperate with Mr. Lumpkin in all other respects.     
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Further, this Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution 
maintaining trust, escrow, operating, and/or any other law account(s) of 
respondent, shall serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre 
T. Lumpkin has been duly appointed by this Court and that respondent is enjoined 
from making withdrawals or transfers from or writing any check or other 
instrument on any of the account(s).
Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
shall serve as notice that the Receiver, Peyre T. Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly 
appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the 
authority to direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
The appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months unless an 
extension of the period of the appointment is requested. 
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
 FOR THE COURT 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March 31, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

George Francis Brown, Appellant, 
v. 
Julie Krick Brown, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001259 
Appeal From Pickens County 

Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Family Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5311 

Heard December 10, 2014 – Filed April 8, 2015 

AFFIRMED 
Sarah Ganss Drawdy, of Byrholdt Drawdy, LLC, of 
Anderson, for Appellant. 
Robert Scott Dover, of Law Offices of Scott Dover, of 
Pickens, for Respondent. 
Kelvin R. Kearse, of Easley, Guardian ad Litem.   
WILLIAMS, J.:  George Brown (Husband) appeals the family court's final 
divorce decree, arguing the family court improperly (1) divided the marital estate 
given the short duration of Husband and Julie Brown's (Wife) marriage, (2) 
awarded custody of the parties' minor children to Wife, and (3) ordered Husband to 
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pay a portion of Wife's attorney's fees and guardian ad litem (GAL) fees.  We 
affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Husband and Wife married on January 1, 2003.1  The majority of Husband and 
Wife's eight-year marriage was one of long distance.  The day after the parties 
were married, Husband left for military training in California.  Soon after the 
parties married, Wife became pregnant with triplets.  In the four months prior to 
the triplets' birth, Wife was placed on complete bed rest by her treating physicians.  
Husband did not visit Wife while she was on bed rest because he was stationed in 
California. 
Toward the end of Wife's bed rest, she unexpectedly went into preterm labor.  
Husband immediately flew across the country and arrived the morning after the 
triplets were born. He remained home for twelve days before returning to 
California. Because the triplets were born unexpectedly—and, thus, were 
significantly premature—they were hospitalized for fifty-two days after their birth.  
Other than the twelve days following their birth, Husband was unable to visit the 
triplets while they were hospitalized and was not present when the triplets were 
discharged from the hospital.   
Wife was again bedridden from September 2004 to February 2005 following 
complications from surgery.  During this time, Husband only returned home for 
several days around Christmas.  Prior to the triplets' first birthday, Wife and the 
children drove across the country and relocated to California to be with Husband 
for approximately nine months.  Thereafter, Wife and the triplets returned to 
Clemson, South Carolina.  Husband then went to Texas and Arizona for additional 
military training while Wife and their children remained in South Carolina.  
Husband was deployed with the U.S. military from October 13, 2006, until June 
24, 2007. While deployed, Husband was notified by the American Red Cross that 
Wife had gone into early labor. Husband was able to return home from overseas 
on December 30, 2006, the day prior to the child's birth.  Husband stayed with 
Wife and the children for six days before he had to return for his deployment in the 
Middle East. 
1 This was the first marriage for both parties and neither party had any children 
from prior relationships.  
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Husband returned to South Carolina from his military deployment on June 30, 
2007. He then left the country on July 5, 2007, to work as an independent 
government contractor in the Middle East.  Husband ended his employment as a 
government contractor in the Middle East and returned home on December 22, 
2010. The parties resided together in Clemson until Husband left on January 10, 
2011, to take a job as a government contractor in Charlottesville, Virginia, 
approximately four hundred miles away.  Husband's job in Charlottesville provided 
health insurance for Wife and their children.  After Husband moved to 
Charlottesville, Wife filed for divorce on February 7, 2011.  Upon Wife's filing for 
divorce, Husband relocated to Augusta, Georgia, and began working with a 
Virginia-based technology firm. 
In Wife's complaint, she requested—among other relief—custody of the parties'
children, temporary alimony, child support, equitable division of the marital estate, 
the appointment of a GAL, the issuance of restraining orders, and attorney's fees.  
Wife alleged that, in the four-year period from the birth of their fourth child until
she filed for divorce, Husband only lived in the marital home for ninety-four days, 
which eventually caused the break-up of their marriage.  
Husband answered and counterclaimed, seeking custody of the children, an order 
barring Wife from receiving alimony, equitable division of the marital assets and 
debts, and attorney's fees.  While Husband acknowledged his military deployment 
and subsequent overseas employment as a government contractor contributed to 
the break-up of their marriage, he stated Wife's mismanagement of their finances 
and alleged adultery also contributed to the failure of their marriage.
The family court issued a temporary order on April 26, 2011, in which the court
addressed several issues raised by the parties.  In ordering joint custody, the family 
court stated Wife would be the primary custodian.  The family court granted Wife 
four nights per week and Husband three nights per week in overnight visitation 
with the children. While in Husband's care, the family court designated Husband's 
mother (Grandmother) as the children's primary care provider.  Because Husband 
commuted from Augusta to Clemson, Grandmother would care for the children 
until Husband arrived. 
Regarding the parties' assets, the family court determined they had a joint checking 
account that contained approximately $80,000 prior to the commencement of 
litigation. The family court concluded Wife had already withdrawn $30,000 from
this account. The court ordered Husband to retain the remaining $50,000 and for 
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each party to be responsible for the preservation of the funds in his or her 
possession pending the outcome of the litigation. 
The court also appointed a GAL to represent the interests of the minor children.  
Within one month of the temporary order, the GAL requested a hearing based on 
the GAL's concern with the escalating tension between the parties and its effect on 
the children. As a result of this hearing, the family court issued an order on July 
19, 2011, and found Wife would retain primary custody of the children.  Pursuant 
to the order, Husband's visitation was adjusted to accommodate the changing 
nature of his work schedule, and the parties were ordered to undergo a 
psychological evaluation.  
In January 2012, Grandmother—who provided a substantial amount of care for the 
parties' children while in Husband's care— temporarily moved away from South 
Carolina to care for her daughter. Because Grandmother could no longer be 
children's primary caretaker while in Husband's custody, the parties began paying 
for children to have afterschool care in Clemson.  At the end of that summer, Wife 
relocated the children to a new elementary school outside Clemson in which she 
worked as a special needs teacher.  As a benefit of her employment, the elementary 
school provided afterschool child care to the children at no cost to Wife.  In 
response to Wife's decision to enroll the children at a new school, Husband moved 
for an expedited temporary relief hearing.  Husband requested the family court 
change the custodial arrangement or require Wife to transfer the children back to 
their former elementary school.  The family court denied Husband's motion.  
The family court held a final hearing in February 2013.  By the final hearing, Wife 
was employed full-time and earned $3,685 per month as a special needs teacher in 
Seneca, South Carolina. Husband earned $5,833 per month working in Augusta, 
Georgia, as an intelligence professional with a Virginia-based technology firm.  At 
the final hearing, Husband and Wife submitted evidence and testimony to 
substantiate their claims to the family court.   
During Husband's testimony, he explained why he was best suited to be the 
children's primary caretaker.  Although Husband acknowledged he was frequently 
not present, he testified he had been very involved in the children's lives since he 
moved back from Virginia.  Although Husband lived in Aiken and worked in 
Augusta, Husband testified he commuted weekly to spend time with their children.  
When in Clemson, Husband testified he was active in the children's education and 
routinely assisted the children with their homework.  When the children were at 
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their former elementary school, Husband stated he was a volunteer and chaperoned 
field trips. Husband adamantly opposed Wife's decision to change the children's 
schools, stating all of their friends and his extended family resided in the Clemson 
area, and their attendance at the new school in Seneca prevented him from 
volunteering or chaperoning their field trips. 
When questioned about their marriage, Husband stated he did not initially want to 
get a divorce and tried talking to Wife to change her mind.  Once they separated, 
Husband believed Wife was shirking her responsibilities and acting immaturely.  
Husband also believed Wife committed adultery during their marriage—while he
was overseas—and testified that Wife's financial mismanagement of their money 
contributed to the break-up of their marriage.    
In support of his claim that Wife managed the parties' money carelessly, Husband 
stated that while he was overseas, his salary was deposited into a joint checking 
account to which Wife had full access. Husband claimed Wife spent his earnings 
frivolously and stated he only spent approximately $16,000 of the $600,000 he 
earned between 2008 and 2010. According to Husband, Wife greatly depleted 
their liquid assets because of her spending issues and diminished the value of their 
home by allowing it to fall into disrepair.  Husband noted Wife's expenditures of 
almost $12,000 in 2010 for childcare expenses as evidence of Wife's spending 
habits. 
Additionally, Husband discussed the children's health issues and his belief that 
Wife was not routinely administering the Synthroid medication for two of the 
children's hypothyroidism.  In support of his claim, Husband introduced the 
deposition of Dr. Raymond Flanders, the children's pediatrician.  In his deposition, 
Dr. Flanders stated two of the three triplets had hypothyroidism, which was being 
treated through the administration of Synthroid.  Dr. Flanders' notes reflected that 
Wife was aware of this condition and advised of the proper medication and 
dosages for the treatment of hypothyroidism.  In Dr. Flanders' medical opinion, the 
children were healthy and nothing in his records reflected the children were ever 
medically neglected. 
Husband also submitted the deposition testimony of Dr. Elaine Moreland, a 
pediatric endocrinologist, who treated the children for their hypothyroidism.  Dr. 
Moreland stated the increase in their thyroid-stimulating hormone level could have 
been caused by the girls outgrowing their dosage or by it not being administered on 
a daily basis. 
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Last, Husband submitted the deposition testimony of George Woodruff, Ph.D., a 
licensed clinical psychologist. Dr. Woodruff stated his interaction with the 
children stemmed from Grandmother's concerns of anxiety related to the children's 
adjustment issues.  Based upon his counseling sessions, he concluded all of the 
children were emotionally secure and gave them a good prognosis.  He stated all of 
the children had adjusted to their new school and were doing well, even without 
counseling. When questioned about a custody arrangement, he believed it was in 
the children's best interests to have a conventional custody arrangement with the 
noncustodial parent exercising visitation every other weekend and on holidays.   
During Wife's testimony, she stated Husband's return overseas as a government 
contractor after his initial deployment with the military significantly contributed to 
the break-up of their marriage.  Although she emailed him every day, she stated 
she only received phone calls from him once every two weeks, and it was very 
stressful not knowing what he was doing or whether he was safe. She testified, "I 
was constantly doing everything I could and I had had it. I needed to feel loved by 
him. I needed to feel appreciated and that he wanted to be a part of this family that 
I had been raising on my own."  Wife complained to Husband numerous times 
about being employed overseas and stated that Husband was rarely home during 
their marriage. In addition to Husband's absence for the majority of the parties' 
marriage, Wife stated Husband treated her poorly and largely ignored her and their 
children. Despite Husband's negative view of Wife, she claimed Husband had no 
hesitation about moving to Charlottesville and leaving her in charge of their home 
and children immediately prior to the parties' separation.
Wife also responded to Husband's allegations of financial mismanagement, 
claiming she used funds from the parties' joint checking account for daily living 
and childcare expenses. Wife explained the child care expenses were reasonable 
because the expenses equated to only $221 per week for childcare for four 
children. Furthermore, Wife claimed Husband had access at all times to their joint 
bank account and a right to monitor its balance and any withdrawals while he was 
overseas. 
After hearing testimony at trial and considering the evidence submitted by the 
parties, the family court issued a final order on April 30, 2013.  In its lengthy 
order, the family court resolved all outstanding issues between the parties.  As it 
relates to Husband's appeal, the family court (1) awarded Wife primary custody of 
the children, (2) awarded Wife 49.60% and Husband 50.40% of the marital estate, 
(3) ordered Wife to pay 40% of the GAL fees and Husband to pay 60% of the GAL 
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fees, and (4) ordered Husband to pay 61% of Wife's attorney's fees.  Husband 

appeals. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de 
novo." Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414-15, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011). 
Thus, this court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own view of the 
preponderance of the evidence; however, this broad scope of review does not 
require the court to disregard the findings of the family court, which is in a 
superior position to make credibility determinations.  Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 
384-85, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651-52 (2011).  
LAW/ANALYSIS  
I. Equitable Division 
Husband claims the family court erred in dividing the marital estate because 

Husband and Wife were only married for eight years, and he made far greater 

financial contributions to the acquisition of the marital assets.  We disagree. 

The division of the marital estate is within the discretion of the family court and 
will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  Craig v. Craig, 365 
S.C. 285, 290, 617 S.E.2d 359, 361 (2005).  In reviewing a division of marital 
property, an appellate court looks to the overall fairness of the apportionment.  
Deidun v. Deidun, 362 S.C. 47, 58, 606 S.E.2d 489, 495 (Ct. App. 2004) (citation 
omitted).  If the end result is equitable, the fact the appellate court would have 
arrived at a different apportionment is irrelevant.  Id. 
Equitable distribution of marital property "is based on a recognition that marriage 
is, among other things, an economic partnership."  Morris v. Morris, 335 S.C. 525, 
531, 517 S.E.2d 720, 723 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Mallett v. Mallett, 323 S.C. 141, 
150, 473 S.E.2d 804, 810 (Ct. App. 1996)).  "Upon dissolution of the marriage, 
marital property should be divided and distributed in a manner which fairly reflects 
each spouse's contribution to its acquisition, regardless of who holds legal title."  
Id. 
Section 20-3-620 of the South Carolina Code provides factors for the family court 
to consider in apportioning marital property and instructs the family court to "give 
weight in such proportion as it finds appropriate" to each of the following factors: 
18 

 (1) the duration of the marriage together with the ages of 
the parties at the time of the marriage and at the time of 
the divorce . . . ;  
(2) marital misconduct or fault of either or both 
parties . . . ; 
(3) the value of the marital property . . . ; 
(4) the income of each spouse, the earning potential of 
each spouse, and the opportunity for future acquisition of 
capital assets; 
(5) the health, both physical and emotional, of each 
spouse; 
(6) the need of each spouse or either spouse for 
additional training or education in order to achieve that 
[spouse's] income potential;  
(7) the nonmarital property of each spouse; 
(8) the existence or nonexistence of vested retirement 
benefits for each or either spouse; 
(9) whether separate maintenance or alimony has been 
awarded; 
(10) the desirability of awarding the family home . . . ;  
(11) the tax consequences to each or either party . . . ; 
(12) the existence and extent of any support obligations, 
from a prior marriage . . . ;  
(13) liens and any other encumbrances upon the marital 
property . . . ;  
(14) child custody arrangements and obligations . . . ; and  
19 

  
 
 
                                        
(15) such other relevant factors as the [family] court shall 
expressly enumerate in its order. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620(B) (2014). 
This court has held "[w]hile there is certainly no recognized presumption in favor 
of a fifty-fifty division, we approve [of] equal division as an appropriate starting 
point for a family court judge attempting to divide an estate of a long-term 
marriage." Doe v. Doe, 370 S.C. 206, 214, 634 S.E.2d 51, 56 (Ct. App. 2006).  The 
purpose of the general fifty-fifty division is to protect the nonworking spouse who 
undertook the household duties and to prevent an award based only on the parties'
direct financial contributions.  Avery v. Avery, 370 S.C. 304, 311, 634 S.E.2d 668, 
672 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted).   
Wife acknowledges—and we agree—that the parties' eight-year marriage was not a 
long-term marriage.  Despite this fact, we believe the family court acted within its 
well-fettered discretion in awarding Wife 49.60% of the marital estate.  We find 
the circumstances of the parties' marriage merit such an award as reflected by the 
family court's thorough consideration of all the relevant factors from section 20-3-
620. 
Husband cites to Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, 396 S.C. 361, 721 S.E.2d 7 (Ct. App. 
2011), and Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 759 S.E.2d 419 (2014),2 in 
support of his argument that Wife is not entitled to a fifty-fifty division of the 
marital assets; however, we find the facts in these cases distinguishable and not 
persuasive authority to overturn the family court's decision.  
2 Husband cites to the court of appeals' decision in Crossland v. Crossland, 397 
S.C. 406, 725 S.E.2d 509 (Ct. App. 2012), in support of his argument.  Our court 
reversed the family court's decision to award the wife 40% of the marital estate, 
instead finding a more appropriate apportionment would be to grant 30% of the 
marital estate to the wife. Id. at 417, 725 S.E.2d at 515. The supreme court had 
yet to render a decision in Crossland at the time the parties filed their briefs with 
our court. However, since that time, the supreme court ruled in Crossland and 
reinstated the family court's 40/60 division between the wife and husband.  408 
S.C. at 459, 759 S.E.2d at 427. Because the court of appeals' decision is no longer 
good law as it pertains to the division of the marital estate, we reference the 
supreme court's opinion from Crossland in this court's analysis.  
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In Fitzwater, the family court awarded the husband 60% of the marital estate when 
the parties were married for ten years and had no children prior to or during their 
marriage. 396 S.C. at 365-66, 721 S.E.2d at 9-10.  Further, the wife in Fitzwater 
brought little or no assets into the marriage, while the husband provided the 
majority of income and assets. Id. at 370, 721 S.E.2d at 12. Our court also 
acknowledged that, prior to their marriage, the husband paid off a significant 
premarital debt of the wife and gave her a house rent free to help the wife order her 
financial affairs. Id.  Unlike the parties in Fitzwater, Husband and Wife have four 
children together. Neither party brought any preexisting obligations, debts, or 
assets into the marriage. All of Husband and Wife's wealth was accumulated 
during the marriage, and the parties' decision for Wife to stay at home and care for 
their four children enabled Husband to accumulate the wealth to which Husband 
now claims he is entitled to a greater share.  
Similarly, we find the facts in Crossland differ greatly from the facts in the instant 
case. In Crossland, the parties were previously married with grown children.  408 
S.C. at 447, 759 S.E.2d at 421. The parties were of retirement age and had no 
children during their ten-year marriage.  Id. The husband brought substantial 
assets into their marriage, whereas the wife owned no assets at the time of the 
marriage and only worked briefly for one year during their marriage.  Id. at 447-48,
759 S.E.2d at 421–22. The parties suffered from various health problems, and the 
wife's health issues prevented her from maintaining gainful employment.  Id. at 
448-49, 759 S.E.2d at 422.  Further, the wife left the husband on multiple 
occasions throughout their marriage.  Id. at 449, 759 S.E.2d at 422. The husband 
estimated the wife only lived in the marital home for five years of their ten-year 
marriage based on various separations initiated by the wife.  Id. 
Unlike the parties in Crossland, Husband and Wife were never previously married, 
and they have four minor children, all born during the marriage.  Both Husband 
and Wife are in good health and not close to retirement age.  Moreover, Wife never 
abandoned Husband or their children at any point during the parties' marriage.  
Although both Husband and the husband in Crossland made far superior financial 
contributions to the acquisition of the marital estate, we—like the supreme court— 
do not find the greater financial contributions outcome determinative, particularly 
when Wife's indirect contributions to the marriage far outweighed those of 
Husband. See id. at 458, 759 S.E.2d at 427 ("Although greater direct financial 
contributions may properly be considered in apportioning a marital estate, that 
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factor is but one of many factors to be considered and does not alone overshadow 
all of the other relevant factors examined by the family court.").   
In sum, none of the facts in Crossland or Fitzwater mirror those found in this case.  
Further, we agree with the family court's consideration of the factors in section 20-
3-620. Thus, we find no basis to reverse the family court's equitable division 
award. 
II. Custody Determination 
Next, Husband claims the family court erred in awarding Wife custody of the 
parties' children.  Specifically, Husband contends the family court failed to address 
the testimony of Dr. Moreland when it concluded Wife would have custody of the 
minor children, thereby necessitating a reversal of the family court's custody 
determination.  We disagree. 
The controlling considerations in child custody cases are the welfare of the 
children and what is in their best interests. Ford v. Ford, 242 S.C. 344, 349, 130 
S.E.2d 916, 920 (1963) (citation omitted).  In making its determination on custody, 
the family court should "consider the character, fitness, attitude, and inclinations 
on the part of each parent as they impact the [children]," as well as "the 
psychological, physical, environmental, spiritual, educational, medical, family, 
emotional and recreational aspects" of the children's lives.  Woodall v. Woodall, 
322 S.C. 7, 11, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996) (citation omitted).  It is also 
appropriate for the family court to account for who has been the primary caretaker 
and consider the opinions of third parties, such as a GAL, expert witnesses, and the 
children. Lewis v. Lewis, 400 S.C. 354, 364, 734 S.E.2d 322, 327 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(citation omitted).
"[A]ll the conflicting rules and presumptions should be weighed together with all 
of the circumstances of the particular case, and all relevant factors must be taken 
into consideration." Woodall, 322 S.C. at 11, 471 S.E.2d at 157 (citation omitted).  
While this court has jurisdiction to correct errors of law and find facts in 
accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, child custody 
decisions are matters left largely to the discretion of the family court.   Shirley v. 
Shirley, 342 S.C. 324, 329-30, 536 S.E.2d 427, 429-30 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations 
omitted).  Thus, this court "should be reluctant to substitute its own evaluation of 
the evidence on child custody for that of the [family] court."  Woodall, 322 S.C. at 
10, 471 S.E.2d at 157 (citation omitted). 
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 Despite the family court's lack of reference to Dr. Moreland's testimony in its final 
order, based on our review of the evidence, we do not believe the exclusion of her 
testimony from the order would require a reversal of the court's custody decision.  
Dr. Moreland stated the higher level of hormones in the children's bodies after 
prescribing the Synthroid was either due to the children's growth or inadequate 
daily dosage. Further, Wife testified extensively at trial about her recollection of 
Dr. Moreland's treatment of the girls.  Wife stated she was aware of Dr. Moreland's 
treatment through the children's pediatrician, as Husband and Grandmother always 
took the children to those appointments.  The family court was in the best position 
to assess Wife's credibility and her testimony, and because of its superior position 
to make credibility determinations, we defer to the weight the family court 
afforded Wife's testimony as it pertained to the children's health issues and medical 
treatment.  See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 384-85, 709 S.E.2d at 651-52 (stating our broad 
scope of review does not require this court to discredit the family court's findings 
because the family court is in a superior position to make credibility 
determinations).   
Husband also contends the family court did not recognize Wife's failure to 
adequately acknowledge two of the children's medical conditions and administer 
the appropriate dosages of medication to control their thyroid condition.  Despite 
the conflict in the parties' testimony over this issue, Husband has presented no 
evidence that Wife refused to properly attend to the children's medical needs.  To 
the contrary, the text message to which Husband cites in his brief demonstrates that 
Wife was aware of their hypothyroidism and had been proactive in teaching their 
daughter to take her pill. Specifically, the text message from Wife to Husband 
reads, "[Child] is on Synthroid.  I taught her how to swallow a pill.  She takes it 
with milk.  I'll make sure you have it Saturday night."  We find this text message is 
evidence that not only did Wife appreciate the nature of their children's conditions, 
but she also took efforts to ensure Husband would have the medication while the 
children were in his care. 
Although not outcome determinative in a custody dispute, Wife has been the 
children's primary caretaker for the entirety of their lives.  We find Wife's role as 
primary caretaker to be a notable consideration by the family court.  Further, we 
discern no evidence that Husband questioned Wife's abilities to care for their 
children while he was across the country or overseas. Despite Husband's 
derogatory comments toward Wife once she filed for divorce, when questioned by 
the GAL at the final hearing, Husband testified Wife was an "incredible mother."  
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The testimony of Dr. Flanders, the children's pediatrician, also supports our 
conclusion that Wife took appropriate medical care of the children.  He specifically 
testified that all the children were healthy, and none of them were medically 
neglected. Dr. Flanders also stated Wife was aware of the children's medical 
conditions and knew the appropriate dosages for treating their hypothyroidism.  
Based on our review of the record, we find both parents are fit to be the children's 
primary custodian; however, we believe Wife is best suited to have primary 
custody of the children. Again, Wife has been the children's primary caretaker for 
the entirety of their lives. Husband set forth no witnesses at the final hearing who 
stated Wife was an unfit parent or lacked the appropriate attitude or inclination to 
care for the children. The children attend the same school where Wife teaches, and 
Husband's employment requires him to frequently travel.  Awarding Husband 
primary custody of the children would also require the children to move, which we 
do not believe would be in the children's best interests.  Based on the foregoing, we 
find the family court properly took all the relevant considerations in mind when 
awarding Wife primary custody of the parties' children.  Accordingly, we affirm
the family court's custody determination.   
III. Fees 
Last, Husband argues the family court erred in the amount of GAL and attorney's
fees it ordered him to pay in the final order.  We disagree. 
A. Attorney's Fees
Husband first claims the family court erred in requiring him to pay 61% of Wife's
attorney's fees. We disagree.  
The family court may order one party to pay a reasonable amount to the other party 
for attorney's fees and costs incurred in maintaining an action for divorce.  See S.C. 
Code Ann. § 20-3-130(H) (2014). In determining the reasonableness of attorney's
fees, the family court should take six factors into consideration: "(1) the nature, 
extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) 
professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial 
results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees for similar services."  Glasscock v. 
Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 161, 403 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1991) (citing Donahue v. 
Donahue, 299 S.C. 353, 365, 384 S.E.2d 741, 748 (1989)).
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The family court ordered Husband to pay 61% of Wife's attorney's fees, thereby 
awarding Wife $26,230 of her attorney's fees after determining (1) the case was 
pending for two years and the trial took place over three days; (2) the time devoted 
by Wife's counsel was necessary given the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case 
in conjunction with the fact that Husband hired three different attorneys over the 
course of the litigation; (3) both parties' attorneys had high professional standing in 
their respective legal communities; (4) Wife succeeded in securing almost 50% of 
the marital estate and obtaining custody of the parties' four children; and (5) the 
fees and litigation expenses incurred by Wife were reasonable.  We find the family 
court's assessment of attorney's fees against Father is reasonable given the 
foregoing factors and, thus, we affirm the family court's decision to order Husband 
to pay $26,230 of Wife's attorney's fees.  
B. GAL Fees 
Husband also contends the family court erred in ordering him to pay 60% of the 
$22,787.64 in GAL fees. Instead, Husband argues the family court should have 
required each party to pay 50% of the GAL fees.  We disagree. 
An award of GAL fees lies within the sound discretion of the family court and will 
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  Nash v. Byrd, 298 S.C. 
530, 537, 381 S.E.2d 913, 917 (Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted).    
Neither party contests the reasonableness of the GAL fee.  Rather, Husband claims 
Wife should be required to pay a slightly greater share of the fees based upon her 
"lack of cooperation and candor during the litigation."  We disagree with 
Husband's claim that Wife was uncooperative and not forthright during the course 
of the litigation. As Wife highlights in her brief, Husband admitted at the final 
hearing that he submitted false statements in affidavits to the family court on at 
least five occasions and made several omissions and misrepresentations in his 
equitable apportionment worksheet.  As a result, we assign less credibility to 
Husband's claim that Wife's actions unnecessarily prolonged the litigation and 
warranted a greater assessment of fees against her.  
We also find Husband failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the family 
court's division of these fees.  In its order, the family court held, "In making this 
allocation, the court is aware that some of the money paid by [Husband] was paid 
from marital funds during this action.  In the overall allocation, the court will 
assign [Husband's] payments as though he paid them from his own funds.  This 
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should offset the Husband's additional 10% assigned."  Husband submitted no 
proof on appeal that the family court's statement was in error.  Accordingly, we 
find the family court properly ordered Husband to pay the remaining GAL fee 
balance of $7,766.33. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the family court's decision is 
AFFIRMED. 

GEATHERS and McDONALD, JJ., concur.  
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